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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
KATHERINE H. CAPELLAN, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 930493-CA 
Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. section 78-2a-3(2)(f), and Utah R. Crim. P. 26(2)(a), 
whereby a defendant in a district court criminal action may take an 
appeal to the Court of Appeals from a final judgment and conviction 
for any crime other than a first degree or capital felony. 
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The pertinent parts of the following statutes and 
constitutional provisions are contained in the text of this brief or 
in Addendum A: 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-4 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 
Utah R. Crim. P. 11 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court err when it revoked Ms. Capellan's 
probation and ordered imprisonment on the basis of an uncounseled 
misdemeanor (shoplifting) conviction for which there was no valid 
waiver of her right to an attorney? "[W]e accord conclusions of law 
no particular deference, but review them for correctness." Scharf v. 
BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985); State v. Mitchell, 824 
P.2d 469, 471 (Utah App. 1991) ("Since questions of constitutional 
rights are questions of law, we give no deference to the trial 
court's conclusion"). 
2. Did the lower court fail to strictly comply with the 
Rule 11 requirements for accepting a guilty plea? "When examining a 
trial court's interpretation of a statutory provision we apply a 
correction of error standard." State v. Swapp, 808 P.2d 115, 120 
(Utah App.), cert, denied, 815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
On March 30, 1990, Katherine H. Capellan entered a plea of 
guilty to the charge of attempted unlawful distribution of a 
controlled substance, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 58-37-4(2)(b)(i)(D), 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii), 
58-37-8(1)(b)(i); 58-37-8(7); and pursuant to a plea bargain 
agreement, (R 15-21), in the Third Judicial District Court in and for 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable David S. Young, 
presiding. (R 22). On April 27, 1990, the court imposed an 
indeterminate sentence of 0-5 years in the Utah State Prison, 
together with various court-ordered amounts. (R 30). The court 
immediately stayed its sentence and placed Ms. Capellan on probation 
for 36 months. (R 30-31). 
35 months later, Adult Probation and Parole ("AP&P") filed 
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an affidavit alleging numerous probation violations. (R 24-25). 
Since Ms. Capellan admitted that she had only made partial payments 
toward various court ordered amounts, the court found her in 
violation of probation and extended the term another 36 months. 
(R 24-25; 28). 
On May 28, 1993, AP&P alleged three other violations. 
(R 33-34). The court addressed the allegations during an order to 
show cause proceeding, held on June 7, 1993. (R 66-73). After an 
evidentiary hearing, the State dismissed two of its allegations due 
to a lack of evidence. (R 85); see (R 74-98) (evidentiary hearing, 
dated June 21, 1993). The remaining allegation claimed "that the 
defendant committed the offense of retail theft" on May 10, 1993, 
although the only basis for the claim was a docket sheet which 
reflected a guilty plea — entered without the assistance of an 
attorney and absent a record waiver of the right to counsel. (R 93); 
State's Exhibit 1. On June 21, 1993, the court determined that the 
State's docket sheet had established a probation violation. (R 93). 
Commitment issued forthwith following the court's execution 
of the previously stayed 0-5 year prison term. (R 97). Other 
procedural aspects of this case are discussed at length in the 
"Statement of the Facts" and the "Argument" sections of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On March 30, 1990, Katherine Capellan pleaded guilty to 
attempted unlawful distribution of a controlled substance. (R 22). 
She was then represented by counsel. (R 20). The court imposed a 
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0-5 year prison sentence, which was immediately stayed in favor of 
probation. (R 30-31). 
On May 28, 1993, Adult Probation and Parole ("AP&P") filed 
an affidavit which alleged three probation violations.1 (R 33-34). 
Two of the allegations were dismissed for lack of evidence. (R 85). 
The remaining allegation claimed that Ms. Capellan had "committed 
tt~ offense [of] Retail Theft, on or about May 10, 1993,t23 in Salt 
La J> County, Utah, which is in violation of condition number 5 of 
the defendant's Probation Agreement." (R 34). 
In an attempt to prove the existence of the retail theft 
(shoplifting) charge, Tamra Shadoan of AP&P obtained a docket sheet 
from the Third Circuit Court, dated June 21, 1993, which listed the 
allegation and the nature of the involved proceedings. (R 79-85); 
State's Exhibit S-l (attached in Addendum B). The certified docket 
1. The first two allegations initially claimed that 
Ms. Capellan had "pled guilty to" a misdemeanor offense. (R 33-34). 
The State, however, conceded that these allegations were in error, 
(R 68-69), and requested that the "pled guilty to" language be 
changed to a "committed the offense of" allegation. (R 69). By 
interlineation, the court so amended the allegations and then later 
dismissed them for lack of evidence. (R 33-34; 85). 
The third allegation did not claim that Ms. Capellan had 
"pled guilty to" a misdemeanor offense. (R 34). Rather, the State 
attempted to show that she had "committed the offense" by referring 
to a notation listed on a "Docket" statement. See State's 
Exhibit S-l. As discussed above, however, such a summary reference 
was an inadequate basis to establish its existence particularly when 
there was no waiver of counsel. 
2. The affidavit in support of the order to show cause 
originally alleged May 11, 1993, as the date of the Retail Theft. 
Following the evidentiary hearing and pursuant to a request by the 
State, the court amended the date by interlineation to May 10, 1993. 
(R 85-86). 
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sheet ,;ilsin noted that Ms. Capeiln i i i > epresented by 
coi i ' i f'ee State's Exhibit S *i ill lie titt JOGKXH. siitH;: i noted the 
entry ol a qui 1 f
 (1 , I neither the docket sheet nor the evidence 
presented [Jut ing tht? order to ;.„!'if.>>> ....... j-rnrprdinqr. established 
i Tripoli an had "knowingly and intelligent! v 
n i s e i . i j i i i i i 1 ' I'.'n.11 i I1 " *" t i; iL »»'* i .* * J >i " j« . 
Ms pellan objected t-n thr- mnli '",; luiirinrr on the docket 
»iiif;i I 111 qu i nq , inter all,- I in nrdei: to use those ctiriiyes 
[Retail Theft j iiqainrtt li-pr f rroni I « liir" circuit court they rthe State] 
have to establish not only did she enter a yailty1 plea to those 
charges, f'bu f] that she did it knowingly and voluntarily, that she 
was represented by an attori ieyf ai id that she was fully informed at 
that time that those pleas of guilty could be used ggainut tier in 
t h e subsequent proceedings. And that was not done," fK BR) 
(emphasis added) ; see also (^ "* i, i Ivy' r^ not going to be 
represented hv an attorney then the defendant, in•.> • "i " r nowingly 
anci ." "i" in " » M i VP their right to have an .attorney pie^i i'1 ) •* 
The I.II 1 , tiowever, >i« "h. I II I I \u-> .f,.fate's reliance ou IT a 
docket sheet was proper and that the notation uiu n i • i •: 
Ms, C ommitted the offense of retail theft suffi^ 0^ *^r 
purposes of establishing a pjn thai • >i "I n n. (R 88'H'j, _ 
court r evoked her probation and committed hoj Lu |.u J I.OII . 
LU*- relevant di scussions from, the proceed i iiijii ,nf,» 
attached ddendu 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
No person may be imprisoned for any offense unless he or 
she is represented by counsel. The trial court here erroneously 
relied on an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction to revoke 
Ms. Capellan's probation and to send her to prison. 
Moreover, the court below failed to strictly comply with 
the applicable requirements when it accepted Ms. Capellan's plea to 
the misdemeanor offense. The order revoking probation should be 
reversed. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ORDER REVOKING PROBATION ERRONEOUSLY 
RELIED ON AN UNCOUNSELED MISDEMEANOR CONVICTION 
" [T i l 11 I f i"! 111 • r I "' i I; i 11" c> s Const i t u t I on regu i r e [ s ] • « - - * - - -
indigent criminal defendant be sentenced ' « i i iprisonment 
'* ~*
 iL
 afforded the right to assistance 01 
appointee i dasar v, I l l ino i s TT S . 
222, 224-2 Stewar* i n r r i n q ) i I I I T ^ J H I ,>eutL v. 
I J, ,.w^> ) . ]ii t h e c a s e a t bar* l l i n |.i i J 
court improper . i nimiinseled misdemeanor 
convictic n a- » i is::? i revoh.ivuj her proibal.i».,,( i'^nUs ", ,g iier 
t' ' | 'I ! '! HI. 
The court's ordc i it ml mi. i I'lb.'iHnn was based on a docket 
sheet which summarized ' ' I H M I I rhh.'ti (shopixli L:\ j, \ ,.",,., M I I T T I S , 
See St.dii.t," " s i> ,.t iiiHiii ' i urn! ii. Addendum B) . A s the coin t. 
acknowledged, "if you luuk nil ""hi »!uru>t »T says "n rtiy .i Lth 
the cas® was filed,, she was arraigned on Mity U H J I , i'i > II I 1(1105 
through II film i-tin i i ? IP) , 'flip listed procedures, howi'V 
also noted that Kather i no uifi? j J ," »,• n> > " t in *i»-icistanc^ of C O M " I 
when shp pled guilty in tho misdemeanor offense ' '"uem't \ , ,' " 
from M !n "! LI l * 'i -i 'leet and the order to ,«/!*HJW cause proceeding 
4 I lie abbreviations, "ATD", refer to "Attorney for The 
Defendant." See State's Exhibit S-l. In Ms. Capellan's case, the 
docket sheet noted, "ATD: None Present11. While no attorney 
represented Ms. Capellan, the prosecution, "PRO", was of course 
represented by various persons through out the proceedings. State's 
Exhibit S-l. 
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was any evidence of a knowing and intelligent waiver of 
Ms. Capellan's right to counsel. State's Exhibit S-l; (R 66-73; 
74-85). 
"Presuming waiver from a silent record is impermissible. 
The record must show, or there must be an allegation and evidence 
which show, that an accused was offered counsel but intelligently 
and understandingly rejected the offer. Anything less is not a 
waiver." Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969) (citation 
omitted). Nothing recorded on the involved docket sheet reflects a 
valid waiver. See State's Exhibit S-l. Since the trial court had 
no basis other than the uncounseled misdemeanor "conviction" for 
revoking Ms. Capellan's probation, (R 93), its reliance on the 
"retail theft (shoplifting)" charge constituted reversible error. 
See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972) ("absent a knowing 
and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense, 
whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was 
represented by counsel at his trial"); Clay v. Wainwright, 470 F.2d 
478 (5th Cir. 1972). 
Clay v. Wainwright, 470 F.2d 478 (5th Cir. 1972), addressed 
virtually the very issue now before this Court. In Clay, the trial 
court placed the defendant on probation for eighteen months after 
Clay had pleaded "nolo contendere" to a manslaughter charge. 
Sentence was issued on December 11, 1968. On February 17, 1969, 
Clay was convicted for a misdemeanor offense which carried a 
"maximum penalty of three months in jail plus a fine. Later, on 
- 8 
May 14 , " " ^ *IP was t i i u d oJ»i . >>hni » <,.' M^r | sdemeanor] 
c h a r g e s l i iV I 2d at 48 1 " i s equen t ly , '.u- n,.,*!1 il in 
a f t u i i w i . - nun.. | . i u i ,
 J l l V
r
« p r o b a t i o n o f f i c e r s e t t i n g t o r t h tti ~~ 
c o n v i c t i o n s of F e b r u a r y mill I' . . . ' , .r -, rrf?rl"r»<1 i n d 
b r o u g h t b e f o r e t h e c o u r t of r e c o r d wh ich , oil J<MU i i , iMi t , I L V . 
i nihil mi i iii i il mil in i m a n s l a u g h t e r , and s e n t e n c e d 
b i n ten i la 1 . 
Fo"M initial slate proceedings, Petitioner Cl^y 
brought J p< m i m i mi habeas corpus alleging "that since he 
had m\t Peon -J i i u»i HI n counsel at III.J Liiin - .npcirafe 
».i "»<lemeanor rtnrrfp^, his convictions therefor[e] were invalid tiiu.1 
in . iiM.'i' in i in in i ^  fit fifrp court's order n m/nklng 
district court granted Liu. > * o* pus 
r 
On appeal, the n i i < M I /unit of Appeals affirmed.5 
Noting that lf[w]ith respect to fill of [Clay's") mi f.'Ioii^ rttfni I, ...IJJ 
. . . 'petit inner wan not- ,-if forded counsel, petitioner did noi waive 
counsel, [andj IM„I.I1.IUH I MI nuini n i , tne appellate court 
upheld the district court Mil i nq vacating the revocation n'li-r. 
1
 these five convictions were procured in violation of 
C.-M - right - 'ounsel , I In \ i ml hn Mrvilwn I, M\\A tlii.if .is a' 
conseguence the order of revocation could not -4 Lam I 
5. Although irrelevant for purposes .., .ssue ui ,-*"^ -
here, the appellate opinion also reversed pari of the district 
court's ruling. See Clay v. Wainwright, ' ^ n 2d 47ft, a a ? - a. 
Cir. 1972). 
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F.2d at 480-81; id. at 482. 
The order revoking Katherine Capellan's probation was 
similarly improper. As explained by Ms. Capellan's counsel, "she 
has to be represented by an attorney while that [misdemeanor] plea 
is taken. She had no representation whatsoever when she [entered 
that] guilty [plea] in the lower court." (R 92); see also (R 88) 
("there's no indication in the record that . . . she entered [the 
plea to the misdemeanor] represented by an attorney[;] . . . in 
order to use [the misdemeanor conviction] against her . . . they 
have to establish not only did she enter a guilty plea to those 
charges, [but also] that she did it knowingly and voluntarily, [and] 
that she was represented by an attorney . . . " ) . 6 The principles 
announced in Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109 (1967), are instructive: 
Gideon v. Wainwrightf, 372 U.S. 335 (1963),] 
established the rule that the right to counsel 
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment was applicable to 
the States by virtue of the Fourteenth, making it 
unconstitutional to try a person for a felony in a 
state court unless he had a lawyer or had validly 
waived one. . . . In this case the certified records 
of the Tennessee conviction on their face raise a 
presumption that petitioner was denied his right to 
counsel in the Tennessee proceeding, and therefore 
that his conviction was void. Presuming waiver of 
6. Cf. (R 89) (by analogy, Ms. Capellan's counsel also 
explained, "if you're going to use somebody's prior conviction 
against them in a court proceedings for impeachment purposes you 
have to establish that they entered a guilty plea on that charge 
knowingly and voluntarily and that they're fully represented by an 
attorney"); accord Loper v. Beto, 405 U.S. 473 (1972) (the 
Constitution precludes using for impeachment purposes a conviction 
which is constitutionally invalid because the accused was denied the 
right to counsel). 
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counsel from a silent record is impermissible. To 
permit a conviction obtained in violation of Gideon v. 
Wainwright to be used against a person either to 
support guilt or enhance punishment for another 
offense is to erode the principle of that case. Worse 
yet, since the defect in the prior conviction was 
denial of the right to counsel, the ace ed in eff^ 
suffers anew from the deprivation of th<*c Sixth 
Amendment right 
Burqett f >u'r I< " i I •' i i ' « hiitted) . 
Ms. |»ellan#ci uncounseled shoplittjiv) \, f.n\ » P H — 
admittedly relirl i, ' y thr trial court to revoke her probation 
and tu w h. I ' i ' > i M •> i M1 i i «-tnnr1. The lower 
1
 ' s *iider of revocation should be vacated. i 1 ,» i 
1
 '
1M
 '
 nf
 "United States v. Tucker, 404 U . f<, 4 A ] ( I 9 7 ») 
(prohibiting :.r>. - ^ ii \\y \ mi i *t* i >nn ro enhance 
the punishment : subsequent . i c u u n s ) ; State v. Priest, /«,-„"." i11 i,d 
57 6 (Yn\\ 1Q* .entenc ^prisonment could not be enhanced by 
DII Lor diversiwn agreement wnere mi ijr€»pmorvl" HMI\ silent as to 
whether defendant eitht . " ssistance oi; counsel U L validly waived 
that II " I cm I mi I "I 
POINT I.L 
THE LOWER COURT FAILED TO STRICTLY COMPLY WITH THE 
RULE 11 REQUIREMENTS FOR ACCEPTING A GUILTY PLEA 
"Gibbons mandated that trial courts strictly comply with 
t n n n • i i 11 y pleas a n d ti e 1 d v iat 
Rule 11(5) 'squarely places nnii- i im IIMHII > i i < i| 
that constitutional Rule [11(5)] requirements are complied vni « 
a gui. * f»i:•• >' \
 f " ' State v . H o f f , if I >« i" '?H 111 9 , 1 1 2 2 
(Utah 1991 t i n g S t a t e v . Gibbons, Viifi i , m ' 
1987)). The circuit court here, however, failed to adhere to Rule 
ll's requirements. State's Exhibit S-l; Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e). 
Besides not being represented by an attorney during the 
misdemeanor proceedings, Ms. Capellan's counsel also questioned 
whether the involved docket sheet, see State's Exhibit S-l, had 
established that her plea was knowing and voluntary, and whether 
Ms. Capellan had understood the ramifications of her plea. (R 88); 
cf. Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e). 
Failing to advise a defendant of the consequences of his or 
her plea is inexcusable under Utah law. For instance, in State v. 
Banford, 368 P.2d 473 (1962), the supreme court reversed a prison 
sentence because "nothing was told him [the defendant] by the court 
as to the consequences of a plea of guilty or that such a plea would 
subject him to a term in the state prison." Id. at 474 (emphasis 
added). While the statutory basis then in effect has since been 
altered, the equally rigid requirements of Rule 11 continue to 
require that the lower court explain the consequences of the plea to 
the defendant. See Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e). 
Rule 11(e)(5) states that, prior to accepting a guilty 
plea, the court must determine if "the defendant knows the minimum 
and maximum sentence . . . that may be imposed for each offense to 
which a plea is entered. . ." Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)(5). In 
Ms. Capellan's case, though, the court said nothing about a prison 
sentence — the maximum sentence ultimately imposed for the 
shoplifting conviction. Indeed, barely one month had passed before 
- 12 -
Adult Parole & Probation used that very conviction to revoke her 
probation and to send her to prison, (R 31-34). 
Rule 11 was not strictly complied with. Katherine Capellan 
uninformed plea should not have been used during the revocation 
proceedings as the basis for imprisonment. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court vacate the 
lower court's order revoking probation. 
SUBMITTED this p\ day of March, 1994. 
W7,Vn^ 
RONALD S.'-FUJINO 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
LYNN R. BROWN 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, RONALD S. FUJINO, hereby certify that I have caused eight 
copies of the foregoing to be delivered to the Utah Court of 
Appeals, 230 South 500 East, Suite 400, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102, 
and two copies to the Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this <Pl day of March, 1994. 
vfeV^ 5. 
RONALD S. INO 
DELIVERED this a! day of March, 1994 
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ADDENDUM A 
58-37-8 OCCUPATIONS AND PROFESSIONS 
an oral prescription, that is not obtained within ten days of the date 
the prescription was written or authorized, may not be filled or dis-
pensed, 
(g) An order for a controlled substance in Schedules II through V for 
use by an inpatient or an outpatient of a licensed hospital is exempt from 
all requirements of Subsection (7) if the order is: 
(i) authorized by the physician treating the patient and designates 
the quantity ordered; 
(ii) entered upon the record of the patient, the record is signed by 
the prescriber affirming his authorization of the order within 48 
hours after filling or administering the order, and the patient's record 
reflects the quantity actually administered; and 
(iii) filled and dispensed by a pharmacist practicing his profession 
within the physical structure of the hospital, or the order is taken 
from a supply lawfully maintained by the hospital and the amount 
taken from the supply is administered directly to the patient autho-
rized to receive it. 
(8) No information communicated to any licensed practitioner in an at-
tempt to unlawfully procure, or to procure the administration of, a controlled 
substance is considered to be a privileged communication. 
History: L. 1971, ch. 145, fi 6; 1972, ch. 21, tions (l)(a) and (2), rewrote the introductory 
ft 1; 1977, ch. 29, S 5; 1979, ch. 12, ft 4; 1980, paragraph of Subsection (3)(a), rewrote Subsec-
ch. 6, ft 39; 1984 (2nd S.S.), ch. 15, ft 96; 1985, tion (3Kb), rewrote the introductory paragraph 
ch. 187, ft 81; 1986, ch. 23, ft 4; 1986, ch. 194,
 0f Subsection (4)(a), and rewrote Subsection 
ft 13; 1987, ch. 92, ft 99; 1987, ch. 161, ft 202; (5)(a) 
1989, ch. 225, ft 61; 1989, ch. 253, ft 2; 1991,
 The 1 9 9 3 ^^^^^ effective May 3,1993, 
ch. 198, ft 3; 1993, ch. 39, ft 2. inserted "denied" and made punctuation 
Amendment Notes. - The 1991 amend-
 c h Subsection (4)<aXiv). 
ment, effective April 29,1991, rewrote Subsec-
58-37-8. Prohibited acts — Penalties. 
(1) Prohibited acts A — Penalties: 
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person 
to knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent to 
produce, manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit sub-
stance; 
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree, 
consent, offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled or counterfeit 
substance; 
(iii) possess a controlled substance in the course of his business as 
a sales representative of a manufacturer or distributor of substances 
listed in Schedules II through V except that he may possess such 
controlled substances when they are prescribed to him by a licensed 
practitioner; or 
(iv) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to 
distribute. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a) with respect to: 
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or II is guilty of a second 
degree felony and upon a second or subsequent conviction of Subsec-
tion (l)(a) is guilty of a first degree felony; 
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(ii) a substance classified in Schedule III or IV, or marijuana, is 
guilty of a third degree felony, and upon a second or subsequent 
conviction punishable under this subsection is guilty of a second de-
gree felony; or 
(iii) a substance classified in Schedule V is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor and upon a second or subsequent conviction punishable 
under this subsection is guilty of a third degree felony. 
(2) Prohibited acts B — Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful: 
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a 
controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a valid prescrip-
tion or order, directly from a practitioner while acting in the course of 
his professional practice, or as otherwise authorized by this subsec-
tion; 
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in control of any 
building, room, tenement, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other place know-
ingly and intentionally to permit them to be occupied by persons 
unlawfully possessing, using, or distributing controlled substances in 
any of those locations; 
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to be present 
where controlled substances are being used or possessed in violation 
of this chapter and the use or possession is open, obvious, apparent, 
and not concealed from those present; however, a person may not be 
convicted under this subsection if the evidence shows that he did not 
use the substance himself or advise, encourage, or assist anyone else 
to do so; any incidence of prior unlawful use of controlled substances 
by the defendant may be admitted to rebut this defense; 
(iv) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess an al-
tered or forged prescription or written order for a controlled sub-
stance; 
(v) for a practitioner licensed under this chapter knowingly and 
intentionally to prescribe, administer, or dispense a controlled sub-
stance to a juvenile, without first obtaining the consent required in 
Section 78-14-5 of a parent, guardian, or person standing in loco 
parentis of the juvenile except in cases of an emergency; for purposes 
of this subsection, a juvenile means a "child" as defined in Section 
78-3a-2, and "emergency" means any physical condition requiring 
the administration of a controlled substance for immediate relief of 
pain or suffering; 
(vi) for a practitioner licensed under this chapter knowingly and 
intentionally to prescribe or administer dosages of a controlled sub-
stance in excess of medically recognized quantities necessary to treat 
the ailment, malady, or condition of the ultimate user; or 
(vii) for any person to prescribe, administer, or dispense any con-
trolled substance to another person knowing that the other person is 
using a false name, address, or other personal information for the 
purpose of securing the same. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect 
to: 
(i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more, is guilty of a 
second degree felony; 
297 
307 UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE R u l e 11 
Cross-References. — Harmless error, Rights of accused, Utah Const., Art. I, §§ 7 
U.R.Cr.P. 30. to 13; § 77-1-6. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
thereto; and where defendant was not given 
time to plead to such information, court com-
mitted reversible error. State v. Jensen, 83 
Utah 452, 30 P.2d 203 (1934). 
Waiver of objections. 
Subdivision (c) merely reaffirms the general 
legal rule that all objections, including those to 
proceedings in the circuit court, must be made 
before a guilty plea is entered or the objections 
will be waived. State v. Humphrey, 794 P.2d 
496 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), rev'd on other 
grounds, 823 P.2d 464 (Utah 1991). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Key Numbers. — Criminal Law «- 261(1), 
Law §§ 433 to 438. 263, 264. 
C.J.S. — 22 C J.S. Criminal Law § 355 
seq. 
Rule 11. Pleas. 
(a) Upon arraignment, except for an infraction, a defendant shall be repre-
sented by counsel, unless the defendant waives counsel in open court. The 
defendant shall not be required to plead until the defendant has had a reason-
able time to confer with counsel. 
(b) A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, no contest, not guilty by 
reason of insanity, or guilty and mentally ill pursuant to Rule 21.5. A defen-
dant may plead in the alternative not guilty or not guilty by reason of insan-
ity. If a defendant refuses to plead or if a defendant corporation fails to appear, 
the court shall enter a plea of not guilty. 
(c) A defendant may plead no contest only with the consent of the court 
(d) When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty, the case shall forthwith be 
set for trial. A defendant unable to make bail shall be given a preference for 
an early trial. In cases other than felonies the court shall advise the defen-
dant, or counsel, of the requirements for making a written demand for a jury 
trial. 
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and 
mentally ill, and may not accept the plea until the court has found: 
(1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has know-
ingly waived the right to counsel and does not desire counsel; 
(2) the plea is voluntarily made; 
(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of innocence, 
the right against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a speedy 
public trial before an impartial jury, the right to confront and cross-exam-
ine in open court the prosecution witnesses, the right to compel the atten-
dance of defense witnesses, and that by entering the plea, these rights are 
waived; 
(4) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense to 
which the plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution would have the 
burden of proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and 
that the plea is an admission of all those elements; 
(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and if 
applicable, the minimum mandatory nature of the minimum sentence, 
that may be imposed for each offense to which a plea is entered, including 
the possibility of the imposition of consecutive sentences; 
(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea 
agreement, and if so, what agreement has been reached; 
ANALYSIS 
Additional time to plead. 
Waiver of objections. 
Additional time to plead. 
Where original information did not state 
public offense and was amended so as to state 
public offense for first time, as amending infor-
mation in larceny prosecution so as to allege 
ownership of property alleged to have been sto-
len, it was equivalent of a new information re-
quiring arraignment of defendant and his plea 
ADDENDUM B 
CIRCUIT COURT - SLC 
dant Citation: 
D O C K E T 
C94080 
Page l 
MONDAY JUNE 21, 1993 
8:16 AM 
SLP Case: 931006041 MC 
Agency No.: 93-57809 
APELLEN, KATHY H 
490 SOUTH 400 EAST 
2 
LC UT 84115 
City Misdemeanor 
Judge: Dennis M. Fuchs 
es 
iclation Date: 05/10/93 
. RETAIL THEFT (SHOPLIFTING) 
Sev: MB Attrib: 0 
. WARRANT OF ARREST FEE 
Sev: Attrib: 0 
OTN #: 094080 
11.36.060 
WARRANT FEE 
5/18/93 at 10:00 A in room 1 with ARR 
5/21/93 at 10:00 A in room 1 with ARR 
C/O $505 B/W TO ISSUE 
edings 
/93 Case filed on 05/11/93. 
ARR scheduled for 
/93 ARR scheduled for 
/93 Mis Arraignment JUDGE: T. PATRICK CASEY 
TAPE: 1101 COUNT: 1438 
ATD: None Present PRO: ATKIN, MARSHA 
Deft is not present 
DEFT FAILED TO APPEAR 
/93 Warrant ordered 
Warrant printed 
Warrant order updated 
BENCH WARRANT issued - JUDGE TPC 
Failure to appear for hearing 
Bail amount ordered: 435.00 
Warrant fee: 70.00 
Added WARRANT FEE to charge list. 
/93 Warrant recalled on 05/27/93 because Booked 
Mis Arraignment JUDGE: FRANCES M. PALACIOS 
TAPE: 1149 COUNT: 1505 
ATD: None Present PRO: ZOLLINGER, STEVE 
Deft is not present 
ARR scheduled for 
DEFT OUT TO ANOTHER COURT C/O 
ARR scheduled for 5/27/ 
/93 Mis Arraignment JUDGE 
TAPE: 1126 COUNT: 
ATD: None Present 
Deft is present 
Chrg: 11.36.060 
Chrg: 11.36.060 
C/O SNT: 5DJ/CTS TO CLEAR CASE'e 
Entered case disposition of: Closet 
vA^ 'le^ o'-Guilt 
c 0£j.ridingv^ 
Bail 
.00 
70.00 
LCK 
LCK 
LMC 
PLD 
PLD 
PLD 
PLD 
PLD 
SCC 
SCC 
SCC 
SCC 
SCC 
SCC 
SCC 
SCC 
LCK 
MEM 
MEM 
MEM 
MEM 
MEM 
MEM 
LCK 
BSM 
BSM 
BSM 
BSM 
-*SM 
BSM 
BSM 
CKO 
rHIRD CIRCUIT COURT - SLC 
Defendant C i t a t i o n : 
CAPELLEN, KATHY H 
D O C K E T 
C94080 
Page 2 
MONDAY JUNE 21, 1993 
8:16 AM 
SLP Case: 931006041 MC 
Agency No.: 93-57809 
City Misdemeanor 
05/28/93 Judge ID changed from ARR to DMF 
Citation Amount: 
CKO 
A d d i t i o n a l Case Data 
S e n t e n c e Summary 
1. RETAIL THEFT 
Jail: 5 DA 
2. WARRANT FEE 
Plea: Guilty 
Suspended: 
Plea: 
Case Disposition 
Disposition..••: Closed 
Personal Description 
Sex: F DOB: 01/17/54 
Dr. Lie. No.: 
Employer: 
Height: 0 00 Weight: 000 
Vehicle Year: 00 Make: 
Scheduled Hearing Summary 
ARRAIGNMENT 
ARRAIGNMENT 
ARRAIGNMENT 
ARRAIGNMENT 
State: UT 
Eyes: 
Model: 
Find: Guilty Plea 
Find: 
DATE: 05/28/93 
Expires: 
Soc. Sec. No.: 528 86 2442 
Hair: Race: 
Style: Color: 
on 05/18/93 
on 05/21/93 
on 05/27/93 
on 05/28/93 
1000 A in room 1 with A 
1000 A in room 1 with A 
1001 A in room 1 with A 
1000 A in room 7 with A 
End of the docket report for this case. 
ADDENDUM C 
WITH THE EVIDENCE AND THAT WOULD MAKE IT MAY THE 10TH. 
JUDGE YOUNG: DO YOU HAVE ANY OBJECTION TO THAT, 
MR. BROWN? 
MR. BROWN: I HAVE NO OBJECTION TO THAT. 
JUDGE YOUNG: ALL RIGHT. I'VE AMENDED IT BY 
INTERLINEATION ON THE AFFIDAVIT. 
YOU HAVE NO FURTHER WITNESSES THEN, MR. PARKER? 
MR. PARKER: NONE. 
JUDGE YOUNG: THANK YOU. 
MR. BROWN? 
MR. BROWN: I HAVE NO WITNESSES. 
JUDGE YOUNG: DO YOU WISH TO ARGUE IT? 
MR. BROWN: WITH REGARD TO ALLEGATION NUMBER 
THREE THEY'VE ALLEGED THAT SHE COMMITTED THE OFFENSE OF 
RETAIL THEFT AND THERE'S BEEN NO PROOF THAT SHE COMMITTED 
ANY OFFENSE OF RETAIL THEFT. WHEN YOU WANT TO BRING EVI-
DENCE WITH RESPECT TO THAT YOU HAVE TO PUT ON WITNESSES 
THAT PROVE THAT SHE STOLE SOMETHING ON SUCH AND SUCH A 
DATE. THERE'S NO SUCH PROOF HERE TODAY. I MEAN— 
JUDGE YOUNG: WELL, I HAVE A HARD TIME UNDER-
STANDING WHAT THE DIFFICULTY IS WHEN THEY BRING—THEY DON'T 
HAVE TO PROVE THE UNDERLYING OFFENSE IF SHE PLEAD GUILTY. 
AND I SEE ON MAY 28TH, '93 BEFORE JUDGE FUCHS, CONSISTENT 
WITH HIS DOCKET, THAT SHE ENTERED A GUILTY PLEA TO THIS 
OFFENSE, THAT HE SENTENCED HER TO FIVE DAYS IN JAIL, AND 
EILEEN M. AMBROSE, C.S.R. r\ r r> O r 13 
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1
 ' CLOSED THE CASE. 
2
 | MR. BROWN: I UNDERSTAND THAT, BUT THE COURT 
APPARENTLY FELT IT APPROPRIATE LAST TIME HERE TO AMEND IT 
TO SHOW THAT SHE HAD COMMITTED THE OFFENSE ON THE OTHER TWO 
ALLEGATIONS RATHER THAN THAT SHE ENTERED A GUILTY PLEA TO 
6
 I THOSE TWO ALLEGATIONS. IF IT IS APPROPRIATE TO PUT IN 
7
 THEIR AFFIDAVIT THAT SHE PLED GUILTY TO THOSE TWO OFFENSES 
8
 I THEN I GUESS IT IS APPROPRIATE TO PROCEED THAT WAY. BUT 
THEY HAVEN'T ALLEGED IN THEIR AFFIDAVIT THAT SHE PLEAD 
GUILTY TO THOSE TWO OFFENSES. THEY HAVE ALLEGED IN THEIR 
11
 I AFFIDAVIT, AND THEY'VE ALLEGED THE OTHER TWO TO CONFORM TO 
12
 THAT, THAT SHE COMMITTED THOSE TWO OFFENSES. SO— 
13
 JUDGE YOUNG: WELL, THERE CAN BE NO, UNLESS YOU 
14
 SHOW ANY KIND OF EVIDENCE IN THIS PROCEEDING, THAT THEY 
15
 | HAVE THE WRONG PERSON, THERE CAN BE NO DISPUTE OF THE 
VALIDITY OF THEIR ALLEGATION NUMBER THREE. THE DATE MAY 
11TH THAT THEY BEGAN WITH IS THE DATE THE CASE WAS FILED SO 
THE OFFENSE OCCURRED THE DAY BEFORE. AND IF YOU LOOK AT 
19
 | THE DOCKET, WHICH I HAVE IN FRONT OF ME, IT SAYS ON MAY 
20
 I 11TH THE CASE WAS FILED, SHE WAS ARRAIGNED ON MAY 18TH, AND 
21
 ' THEN IT GOES THROUGH THE PROCEDURES. SHE THEN APPEARED 
BEFORE PATRICK CASEY ON MAY 21ST AND SO ON AND THEN ENTERED 
HER PLEA BEFORE JUDGE FUCHS ON MAY 28TH. NOW, TO ME, I'M 
24
 | HAVING A HARD TIME UNDERSTANDING HOW, NUMBER ONE, ALLEGA-
TION NUMBER THREE OF THE AFFIDAVIT WOULD NOT GIVE HER CLEAR 
16 
17 
18 
22 
23 
25 
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NOTICE AND, NUMBER TWO, HOW THIS WOULD NOT VERIFY THE FACT 
THAT SHE DID, INDEED, PLEAD GUILTY. AND I DON'T THINK I 
NEED TO HAVE THEM PROVE THE UNDERLYING FACTS OF THE OFFENSE 
IF SHE PLEAD GUILTY. 
MR. BROWN: I DO, FOR THIS REASON, YOUR HONOR. 
THERE'S NO INDICATION IN THE RECORD THAT THE COURT HAS THAT 
SHE ENTERED THOSE PLEAS REPRESENTED BY AN ATTORNEY, FULLY 
ADVISED BY AN ATTORNEY THAT THE FACT THAT IF SHE ENTERED A 
GUILTY PLEA TO THOSE OFFENSES THAT THEY COULD BE USED 
AGAINST HER IN A SUBSEQUENT PROCEEDING ON AN ORDER TO SHOW 
CAUSE, SUCH AS WE HAVE HERE. SHE WAS NOT REPRESENTED BY AN 
ATTORNEY, SHE WAS NOT FULLY INFORMED ON THE RECORD AS TO 
THE TOTAL RAMIFICATIONS OF HER GUILTY PLEA TO THAT, TO THE 
EFFECT THAT UPON ENTERING A GUILTY PLEA TO THAT CHARGE IN 
THE CIRCUIT COURT, THAT SHE COULD BE VIOLATED IN THE DIS-
TRICT COURT AS A RESULT OF THAT. AND I THINK THERE'S CASE 
LAW TO THE AFFECT THAT IN ORDER TO USE THOSE CHARGES 
AGAINST HER IN THE CIRCUIT COURT THEY HAVE TO ESTABLISH NOT 
ONLY DID SHE ENTER A GUILTY PLEA TO THOSE CHARGES, THAT SHE 
DID IT KNOWINGLY AND VOLUNTARILY, THAT SHE WAS REPRESENTED 
BY AN ATTORNEY, AND THAT SHE WAS FULLY INFORMED AT THAT 
TIME THAT THOSE PLEAS OF GUILTY COULD BE USED AGAINST HER 
IN THE SUBSEQUENT PROCEEDINGS. AND THAT WAS NOT DONE. AND 
THAT'S THE BASIS FOR MAY OBJECTION HERE TODAY. 
JUDGE YOUNG: WELL, SHE WAS ON PROBATION AND SHE 
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CLEARLY KNEW FROM HER PROBATION AGREEMENT THAT SHE SHOULD 
NOT VIOLATE ANY LAW OF THE STATE, FEDERAL OR LOCAL GOVERN-
MENT, AND THAT'S A CONDITION OF HER PROBATION. HOW CAN YOU 
ALLEGE THAT SHE HAS TO BE TOLD BEFORE SHE ENTERS A PLEA TO 
ONE OF THOSE OFFENSES OF SOMETHING THAT SHE CLEARLY WOULD 
BE PRESUMED TO UNDERSTAND BY HAVING SIGNED A PROBATION 
AGREEMENT? 
MR. BROWN: I THINK THE CASE LAW WILL SUPPORT 
THAT, THAT SHE HAS TO BE INFORMED, THAT SHE HAS TO BE—WHEN 
YOU USE A CHARGE AGAINST SOMEBODY IN A SUBSEQUENT PROCEED-
ING I THINK THE CASE LAW INDICATES THAT THEY HAVE TO ESTAB-
LISH—FOR EXAMPLE, IF YOU'RE GOING TO USE SOMEBODY'S PRIOR 
CONVICTION AGAINST THEM IN A COURT PROCEEDINGS FOR IMPEACH-
MENT PURPOSES YOU HAVE TO ESTABLISH THAT THEY ENTERED A 
GUILTY PLEA ON THAT CHARGE KNOWINGLY AND VOLUNTARILY AND 
THAT THEY'RE FULLY REPRESENTED BY AN ATTORNEY— 
JUDGE YOUNG: I UNDERSTAND THAT, BUT THAT'S— 
MR. BROWN: —UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES. 
JUDGE YOUNG: THAT'S WHERE YOU'RE USING IT IN 
SUBSEQUENT TRIAL. 
MR. BROWN: BUT I THINK THE SME PRINCIPLE WOULD 
APPLY HERE. THAT WOULD BE MY POSITION. 
JUDGE YOUNG: I SEE. 
MR. PARKER, DO YOU DESIRE TO BE HEARD ON THAT? 
MR. PARKER: I WOULD, YOUR HONOR. AND I'M 
EILEEN M. AMBROSE, C.S.R. C 0CSS 16 
PERSONALLY AWARE OF NO CASE THAT APPLIES THAT PRINCIPLE 
THAT I REALLY THINK WE ARE AT THE CONTEXT THAT'S MOSTLY 
USED WHEN A LATER CRIME IS BEING ENHANCED BY A PRIOR CON-
VICTION. I'M NOT SURE IT APPLIES STRICTLY WHEN WE'RE DOING 
5
 | SUCH THINGS AS IMPEACHING WITNESSES OR WHERE WE'RE IN THE 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
CONTEXT OF AN ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE. I'VE NEVER HEARD ANY-
WHERE THAT AT THE TIME OF A PLEA OF GUILTY THAT THE COURT 
HAS TO ADVISE THAT PERSON THAT IT HAS SOME COLLATERAL 
RAMIFICATIONS, INCLUDING VIOLATING THAT PERSON'S PROBATION. 
BUT EVEN GETTING PAST THAT I THINK IN THIS CASE 
WE HAVE A CONTEXT WHERE THE RULES OF EVIDENCE DON'T STRICT-
LY APPLY AND IN THAT CONTEXT WE HAVE A DOCUMENT THAT SHOWS 
AN ADMISSION BY THE DEFENDANT IN THAT SHE PLEADED GUILTY TO 
THE OFFENSE. AND IF WE ARE TALKING ABOUT ESTABLISHING THE 
UNDERLYING ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE OF THEFT, WHEN THAT 
PERSON GOES IN AND MAKES THE ADMISSION IN COURT AND PLEADS 
GUILTY TO IT, I THINK THAT IS MORE THAN ENOUGH EVIDENCE BY 
ITSELF THAT THE COURT OUGHT TO REVOKE THE PROBATION OF THAT 
PERSON. 
SO I SUPPOSE WHAT I'M ARGUING IS THERE'S TWO 
REASONS THAT THIS IS ADMISSIBLE. ONE, IS BECAUSE IT IS A 
CERTIFIED COURT DOCUMENT AND THOSE CASE LAWS I DO NOT THINK 
ESTABLISH THAT WE HAVE TO BE ANY FURTHER IN AN ORDER TO 
SHOW CAUSE CONTEXT THAN PRESENTATION OF THE DOCUMENT. 
AND, SECONDLY, I BELIEVE THAT THAT STATEMENT, 
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BECAUSE IT IS ADMISSIBLE, ONE, AND BECAUSE OF THE ORDER TO 
SHOW CAUSE RULES AND THE CONTEXT, THAT THE STATEMENT IN 
THERE IS ENOUGH TO PROVE THE UNDERLYING ELEMENTS, AND THAT 
IS THAT SHE WAS ADVISED OF THE ALLEGATIONS OF THEFT AND SHE 
ADMITTED BEFORE A COURT THAT THAT'S WHAT SHE DID. 
JUDGE YOUNG: ALL RIGHT. DO YOU DESIRE TO BE 
HEARD FURTHER, MR. BROWN? 
6
 \ MR. BROWN: YES, ONE FURTHER POIN1 IF THE COURT 
WOULD EVEN REVIEW THE AFFIDAVIT OF THE STATEMENT OF THE 
DEFENDANT THAT WOULD BE USED IN THIS COURT TO TAKE A GUILTY 
PLEA YOU WILL FIND ONE OF THE THINGS THAT YOU ADVISE THE 
DEFENDANT ABOUT IS THE PLEA ON THE CASE THAT YOU ARE DEAL-
ING WITH AT THE PRESENT TIME, IF HE ENTERS A GUILTY PLEA TO 
THAT, THAT COULD BE USED AGAINST HIM ON A SUBSEQUENT PROBA-
TION VIOLATION IF HE HAPPENS TO BE ON PROBATION. SO IT IS 
IN THERE. IT'S SOMETHING THAT THEY'RE SUPPOSED TO TELL 
SOMEBODY ABOUT WHEN THEY ENTER A GUILTY PLEA, THE FACT THAT 
THEY ARE ENTERING A GUILTY PLEA, THAT CAN BE USED IN SUBSE-
QUENT PROCEEDINGS ON AN ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE. AND THAT'S IN 
THE FORMAL AFFIDAVIT WITH THAT THAT ALL THE COURTS USE IN 
THIS JURISDICTION. 
JUDGE YOUNG: ON THE STATEMENT OF THE DEFENDANT? 
MR. BROWN: YES. 
JUDGE YOUNG: WOULDN'T THAT GIVE A HIGHER BASIS 
UPON WHICH THE COURT COULD CONCLUDE THAT SHE WAS 
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KNOWLEDGEABLE ABOUT THE USE OF OFFENSES? 
MR. BROWN: IT CERTAINLY COULD, BUT SHE HAS TO 
BE—SHE HAS TO BE REPRESENTED BY AN ATTORNEY WHILE THAT 
PLEA IS TAKEN. SHE HAD NO REPRESENTATION WHATSOEVER WHEN 
SHE HAD THOSE GUILTY PLEAS IN THE LOWER COURT. 
JUDGE YOT*NG: IF I WERE TO FOLLOW WHAT YOU'RE 
SAYING, EVERYONE THAT IS ON PROBATION WOULD HAVE AN OBLIGA-
TION TO HAVE COUNSEL ATTEND THEIR SUBSEQUENT CHARGE— 
MR. BROWN: OR—YEAH, GO AHEAD. 
JUDGE YOUNG: —BECAUSE IT MAY AFFECT THE UNDER-
LYING OFFENSE ON WHICH THEY'RE ON PROBATION. AND IF SHE 
ELECTS NOT TO HAVE COUNSEL, AND SHE ELECTS TO PROCEED, IT 
COULD BE VERY LIKELY WHAT SHE'S REALLY DOING IS THINKING, 
WELL, THIS IS A MINOR ENOUGH OFFENSE AND IN A SMALL COURT 
MAYBE I'LL—NOBODY WILL PICK IT UP. 
MR. BROWN: NO, I AGREE. THERE IS A SCENARIO 
THAT THEY CAN GO THROUGH WHEN THEY—TO WAIVE THEIR RIGHT TO 
AN ATTORNEY. 
JUDGE YOUNG: BUT NO COURT IS REQUIRED TO ASK, 
WHEN TAKING A PLEA, ARE YOU ON PROBATION FOR ANOTHER OF-
FENSE, THAT THIS MAY RESULT IN YOUR VIOLATION, AND DO YOU 
UNDERSTAND THAT YOU HAVE THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL TO ASSIST YOU 
IN THIS OFFENSE BECAUSE IT MAY RELATE TO THAT? 
MR. BROWN: NO, THEY'RE NOT REQUIRED TO INQUIRE 
AS TO WHETHER OR NOT THEY'RE ON PROBATION ON ANOTHER CHARGE 
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BUT THEY'RE REQUIRED TO TELL THEM THAT IF THEY ARE ON 
PROBATION THAT WHAT THEY'RE DOING HERE, BY ENTERING A 
GUILTY PLEA, COULD POSSIBLY RESULT IN A PROBATION REVOCA-
TION IN THAT OTHER CASE. 
JUDGE YOUNG: ALL RIGHT. 
MR. BROWN: AND IF THEY'RE NOT GOING TO BE REPRE-
SENTED BY AN ATTORNEY THEN THE DEFENDANT HAS GOT TO KNOW-
INGLY AND VOLUNTARILY WAIVE THEIR RIGHT TO HAVE AN ATTORNEY 
PRESENT. 
JUDGE YOUNG: ALL RIGHT. WELL, THE COURT FINDS 
THAT THE STATE HP" BORNE ITS BURDEN OF PROOF IN ESTABLISH-
ING THAT THE DEF*~..JANT COMMITTED THE OFFENSE OF RETAIL 
THEFT. THE SALT LAKE COUNTY CASE NUMBER IS 93-1006041. 
AND THE DEFENDANT APPEARED BEFORE JUDGE DENNIS FUCHS ON MAY 
28TH, 1993 AND ENTERED A PLEA OF GUILTY WHICH ACKNOWLEDGES 
THE CONTEXT OF THE ALLEGATIONS AGAINST HER, THEREFORE, THE 
COURT FINDS THAT SHE HAS VIOLATED THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS 
OF HER PROBATION IN RELATION TO ALLEGATION NUMBER THREE. 
NOW, IS THERE A RECOMMENDATION FROM ADULT PROBA-
TION AND PAROLE? 
MS. SHADOAN: YES, YOUR HONOR. AS YOU ARE AWARE 
WE HAD AN ORDER TO SHOW APRIL 19TH AND HER PROBATION WAS 
REINSTATED FOR 36 MONTHS. AT THIS TIME OUR RECOMMENDATION 
WOULD BE COMMITMENT TO THE PRISON. 
JUDGE YOUNG: ALL RIGHT. THANK YOU. ANYTHING 
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